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Abstract
Crowdsourcing has become an increasingly popular means of flexibly deploying large amounts 
of human computational power. The present chapter investigates the role of microtask labor 
marketplaces in managing human and hybrid human machine computing. Labor marketplaces 
offer many advantages that in combination allow human intelligence to be allocated across 
projects rapidly and efficiently and information to be transmitted effectively between market  
participants. Human computation comes with a set of challenges that are distinct from machine 
computation, including increased unsystematic error (e.g. mistakes) and systematic error (e.g. 
cognitive biases), both of which can be exacerbated when motivation is low, incentives are 
misaligned, and task requirements are poorly communicated. We provide specific guidance to 
how to ameliorate these issues through task design, workforce selection, data cleaning and 
aggregation.  
Risks and Rewards of Crowdsourcing Marketplaces
The present chapter focuses on the risks and rewards of using online marketplaces to 
enable crowdsourced human computation. We discuss the strengths and limitations of these 
marketplaces, with a particular emphasis on the quality of crowdsourced data collected from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Data quality is by far the most important consideration when 
designing computational tasks, and it can be influenced by many factors. We emphasize 
Mechanical Turk because it is currently one of the most popular and accessible crowdsourcing 
platforms and offers low barriers of entry to researchers interested in exploring the uses of 
crowdsourcing. In addition to describing the strengths and limitations of this platform, we 
provide general considerations and specific recommendations for measuring and improving data 
quality that are applicable across crowdsourcing markets.
Crowdsourcing is the distribution of tasks to a large group of individuals via a flexible 
open call, in which individuals work at their own pace until the task is completed (for a more 
detailed definition see Estelles-Arolas & Gonzalez-Ladron-de Guevera, 2012). Crowd 
membership is fluid, with low barriers to entry and no minimum commitment. Individuals with 
heterogeneous skills, motivation, and other resources contribute to tasks in parallel. 
Crowdsourcing leverages the unique knowledge of individual crowd members, the sheer volume 
of their collective time and abilities, or both to solve problems that are difficult to solve using 
computers, or smaller and more structured groups. 
The unique strengths of groups are generally used to solve one of two basic kinds of 
problems. Some problems have no obvious a priori solution, but correct answers seem obvious 
once known (e.g. insight problems; Dominowski & Dallob, 1995) or can be verified. In these 
cases, crowds can generate responses from which the “best” response can be selected according 
to some criteria. The volume and diversity of workers with different perspectives, strategies and 
knowledge can lead to quick, unorthodox, and successful solutions. The Internet has furthered 
this approach to problem solving by creating virtual meeting places where people can post 
problems for others to solve. For example, Innocentive (Allio, 2004) is a website that has helped 
companies find solutions to technical challenges like preventing oxygen from passing through 
rubber, or adding fluoride powder to toothpaste without dispersing it into the air. Often solutions 
to these specialized, technical problems are provided by amateurs, hobbyists, or experts in 
apparently unrelated fields (Larkhani, 2008). 
Tasks that require resources beyond those available to a single individual or work group 
are also well-suited to crowdsourcing. The compilation of the Oxford English Dictionary is one 
early example of this approach. A unique feature of this dictionary is that it includes not only 
definitions, but also published examples of word use. Examples were collected on slips of paper 
by a large body of volunteers and then aggregated by editors (Winchester, 2004). Advances in 
machine computation have made it easier to manage projects of this scale. For example, The 
Open Science Collaboration coordinates the real time collaborative efforts of scientists and 
citizen-scientists to systematically code, replicate and communicate social scientific findings  
using freely available web-software (Open Science Collaboration, 2013). 
A subset of this broad category are tasks that are easy for people to solve, but difficult for 
machines to solve. These assignments are particularly amenable to crowdsourcing. In many 
cases, a crowd’s responses can be automatically aggregated, eliminating the need to 
comprehensively review responses. The volume of workers performing each task can allow 
ideosyncratic perspectives, strategies and knowledge to be homogenized removed through 
aggregation, leaving consistent performance across a task even though each individual completed 
only a small portion of it.  Consequently, advancing machine computation has increased the 
applications of crowdsourcing, with the development of human-machine hybrid systems that 
tackle ambitious projects such as describing the contents of images in near real time (e.g., 
VizWiz; Bigam et al., 2010), classifying millions galaxies (Galaxy Zoo; Lintott et al., 2008), or  
determining the shapes that proteins fold into (Foldit; Cooper et al., 2010). Each of these projects 
emerged as a result of the uneven ability of machine computation to handle the various necessary 
task elements. 
While some platforms for marshaling crowds have been developed to solve specific large 
problems, “crowdsourcing marketplaces” have also emerged to match workers and requesters 
with more modest needs. The most prominent example is Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a 
crowdsourcing website launched by Amazon in 2005 to assist with the maintenance of its own 
websites (e.g. identifying duplicate products; Potin, 2007). Corporations and individuals alike 
use crowds recruited from MTurk to conduct human computation operations. Twitter, for 
instance, relies on MTurk workers to categorize search queries to make them more meaningful to 
other users. Machine computing can easily identify a spike in the popularity of a query (e.g., 
“Big Bird” in Fall 2012), but not its semantic properties. Trending queries are passed on to 
MTurk workers, who can easily determine that this is a result of political events (Mitt Romney’s 
comments in the US Presidential Debate) rather than Sesame Street. 
Scientists have also been quick to harness crowd computing for academic research, 
relying on crowds to complete a variety of time-consuming tasks including generating corpora of 
stimuli for machine learning experiments (Lane, Waibel, Eck, & Rottmann, 2010; Lau, Drew, & 
Nichols, 2009); rating and classifying words according to meaning (e.g., Li, Liu, & Agichtein, 
2008); transcribing speech (Gruenstein, McGraw & Sutherland, 2009; Marge et al., 2010); 
proofreading text for errors (Tetreault, Filatova & Chodorow 2010); verifying citations (Molla & 
Santiago-Martinez, 2011) and coding observational data (e.g. Hsieh, Kraut, & Hudson, 2010). 
Others are experimenting with building more complex workflows, where workers collaborate on 
complex multi-stage projects, or in which workers are treated as agents with a plurality of 
diverse responses, rather than a means of measuring the average beliefs of a population 
(Nickerson, Sakomoto & Yu, 2011; Yu & Nickerson, 2011) 
Strengths of Crowdsourcing Marketplaces
Transaction Cost Effectiveness. The major advantage of marketplaces is that they make 
crowdsourcing accessible to requesters with limited financial and technical resources. The fixed 
costs of crowdsourcing (servers, record keeping, technical support, etc.) can be shared by many 
requesters and the technical challenges can be handled by dedicated specialists. Other less 
tangible efficiencies are also realized through sharing a common platform. Workers only need to 
be recruited into the market once, reducing marketing costs. Moreover, they only need to learn 
how to use a single standardized interface and can share their experiences with others, making it 
easier for them to find, understand, and successfully complete work (Ipeirotis & Horton, 2011). 
Crowd Accessibility. Crowds require a certain critical mass to function. Potential 
workers are unlikely to invest time visiting websites unless they have a reasonable chance of 
finding work (a special case of a two-sided market, see Rochet & Triole, 2003). Some 
crowdsourcing projects, like digitizing every book in the world, or identifying all the stars in the 
sky, are large enough to warrant their own dedicated framework (e.g., reCaptcha; von Ahn et al., 
2008). However, the majority of human computation problems are quick to complete, 
intermittent, or frequently change in content or required knowledge. A common market ensures a 
steady enough supply of tasks to help maintain a persistent crowd, even while individual 
requesters recruit and dismiss workers on demand. MTurk was able to achieve this scale initially 
by serving as a labor market for Amazon’s own in-house human computation needs.
Efficient Matching and Task Completion. Microtask sites pay workers according to the 
tasks they complete, rather than an hourly wage. Piece rates ensure that workers are paid 
according to their productivity, and even assuming minimal variation in worker ability and task 
demands, workers should be able to sort themselves into assignments they do best (Becker & 
Murphy, 1992). Piece rates also benefit requesters. Since each worker proceeds at their own 
pace, receiving new work only when old work is completed, the completion time for a project 
will be driven by the average pace at which tasks are completed, as opposed to traditional 
methods of dividing labor that are often constrained by the pace of the slowest worker (Davis, 
1965).  
Low Market Prices. Aside from a minimal payment to the web service (MTurk charges 
10% of worker payments to cover overhead and financial transaction fees), the only cost faced 
by requesters to crowdsource their tasks is worker compensation. In 2010, Horton and Chilton 
estimated the median reservation wage of MTurk workers to be less than $2 per hour, i.e., less 
than 20% of the wage of the average general secretary in the United States (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010). Current rates are likely higher, but even a rate of $6 per hour is sufficient for a 
task to be posted to one of the the various forums where workers share well-paying HITS (e.g. 
http://www.reddit.com/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor, www.turkernation.com).
There are a number of reasons that workers within certain crowds accept wages which 
traditional workers would not: they can select tasks that are relatively interesting or meaningful  
(Kauffman, Schulze & Veit, 2011), they can work from any location, and they can use time that 
has little other economic value (e.g., completing work between or even in parallel with other 
tasks). MTurk also allows requesters to use workers from regions or countries with lower costs 
of living and lower minimum wages. However, we should also note that the US workers are 
often comprised of people with limited traditional sources of income (Shapiro, Chandler & 
Mueller, 2013) and that researchers may want to consider the ethical implications of the wages 
they offer workers when making payment decisions (for discussions see Horton, 2011; Kittur et 
al., 2013; Silberman, Irani & Ross, 2008).
Trust and Reputation Transparency. Exchanging goods or labor requires a certain 
amount of trust. In offline communities, reputational information is spread informally through a 
community. Online, requesters and workers must interact anonymously with each other, making 
them vulnerable to fraud or exploitation. The division of work into smaller tasks paid as 
piecework prevents the need to engage in long-term commitments between workers and 
recruiters. Workers can try working with a requester once with minimal risk and increase their 
commitment if the first transaction proceeds smoothly. 
Centralizing work within an online marketplace makes it possible to share information 
about potential exchange partners so participants can identify and avoid or sanction 
untrustworthy partners, even when they are effectively anonymous (Resnick, Kuwabara, 
Zeckhauser & Friedman, 2000). MTurk, for example, tracks the proportion of tasks that workers 
successfully complete, and requesters can use this information as a recruitment criterion. 
Particularly unscrupulous workers can be blocked by individual requesters, and multiple blocks 
can result in workers being banned from the marketplace. Similarly, workers maintain ratings of 
requesters (e.g. www.turkopticon.com) that can guide other workers’ decisions about who they 
work for.  
Data Quality. The low cost of labor, combined with the conventional wisdom that “you 
get what you pay for,” can lead to skepticism about the true value of work performed by crowds 
of strangers working for below minimum wage. Empirical examinations have found that data 
quality is not something that can be solved through wages: poorly paid crowds produce data of 
the nearly the same quality as well paid crowds (albeit slowly; Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 
2011; Mason & Watts, 2009), community volunteers (Goodman et al., 2012), or undergraduate 
students (Paolacci et al., 2010). There are forces that ensure quality even when payment is low: 
many tasks that are difficult for machines are trivially easy for people to do, and for more 
difficult tasks, reputational concerns may dissuade workers from submitting poor quality work. 
Further, since most crowdsourcing tasks recruit workers using an open call, high wages attract 
more workers of all skill levels to the task equally. Consequently, features of task design, 
instruction clarity and worker selection drive work quality in crowds, just as they do in more 
traditional workplaces. 
Recruitment Flexibility. Crowdsourcing marketplaces allow requesters to specify that 
workers possess certain attributes in order to complete a task. Worker recruitment on MTurk can 
be restricted to residents of a specific country, or to workers who have completed more than a 
certain number of tasks with a specified rate of accuracy. Moreover, as discussed below, with 
minimal coding knowledge requesters can create and assign ad hoc “qualifications” to workers 
based on nearly any measurable attribute that grant specific workers access to tasks. Thus, 
smaller bespoke crowds can be constructed out of the workforce to complete highly specialized 
tasks. 
Crowds are easy to program. For those with little experience programming machines, a 
major advantage of crowds is that they are comparatively easy to instruct. People are 
experienced at communicating with each other, and actively work to make sense of their 
environment. People also interpret the pragmatic meaning of a request in far more detail than a 
literal reading would suggest, drawing upon contextual details and assumptions based on their 
own experience as communicators (e.g., that all relevant information is provided, and all 
provided information is relevant; for a discussion see Grice, 1989). As a result, crowds are 
tolerant to errors and ambiguity, and can easily go beyond the information provided to complete 
a task as the requester intended. In contrast, even when completing a task as simple as rating the 
positivity of words, a machine requires numerous variables to be defined including the universe 
of words to be rated, the context in which they might be used and the purpose the requester will 
use them to ensure an appropriate range and distribution of responses. 
Limitations of Crowdsourcing Marketplaces
Although crowdsourcing marketplaces offer a number of compelling opportunities, there 
are also some potential challenges that may interfere with the accuracy of human computation.  
Speed and cost are inversely related to each other, and both are constrained by marketplace 
features beyond the control of individual requesters. Data quality may vary by marketplace, but 
also varies highly across tasks and workers and is thus under the direct control of requesters. We 
review several issues that pertain specifically to data quality. 
Lack of motivation. While workers are to some extent intrinsically motivated to 
participate in crowdsourcing tasks (e.g., von Ahn, 2006), motivation is fickle and workers are 
inclined to avoid the most difficult elements of a task (Mason & Watts, 2009, Study 2). In this 
sense they can be regarded as “satisficers” who are likely to do only the minimal amount 
required to ensure payment (Simon, 1972). For example, if workers are asked to search for 
information on the Internet and are paid a reward even if they indicate that the requested 
information is not available, they may be inclined to report that the information does not exist  
without a thorough search. 
Cognitive limitations. Workers are people, and consequently suffer from a long but 
predictable set of cognitive and perceptual biases. This has led behavioral experimentalists 
within diverse disciplines to use workers as a subject pool for research (Goodman, et al., 2012; 
Paolacci et al. 2010; Rand, 2012). However, for the same reason, human computation researchers 
need to acknowledge that crowdsourced workers are not infallible computational agents, but 
rather are boundedly rational individuals that selectively allocate limited and depletable  
cognitive resources (for a general overview see Kahneman, 2011). These biases efficiently lead 
to perceptions beliefs and decisions that are “good enough” under most circumstances. These 
features may make crowdsourcing less suitable for some tasks where the requester seeks 
objectively correct answers through the aggregation of worker responses because aggregation 
cannot remove systematic bias.  
Instruction ambiguity. The same cognitive abilities that make it possible for people to 
“program” a crowd with minimal instructions can pose problems for requesters because these 
processes will draw upon all information – both intentionally and unintentionally communicated 
– to understand a task. There are  numerous examples of how design features such as response 
formats, question order and the affiliation of a communication partner guide inferences about the 
interviewer’s intent and thus influence the responses provided (e.g., Bao, Sakamoto & 
Nickerson, 2011; for a review see Schwarz, 1999). Unfortunately, these features may be selected 
or communicated arbitrarily by requesters, without considering the effects they can have on 
worker’s responses. 
Workers may also make inferences about what a requester wants by drawing on their 
prior experiences with other requesters. For example, Goodman and colleagues (2012) conducted 
a decision making study in which they asked workers to guess the number of countries in Africa 
(adapted from Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although the authors did not explicitly ask workers 
to look this information up, an unusually large proportion of them gave answers that matched 
information available on the Internet. One explanation for this is that it is normative for MTurk 
workers to provide factually correct information, which led workers to believe that the requesters 
desired a factually correct answer rather than a subjective impression. Although little research 
has directly investigated this issue on Mechanical Turk, the importance of tacit norms in other 
workplaces has been extensively documented (Wegner, 1998).  
Worker (non-)naivety. Workers may complete the same task several times or share 
information about tasks with each other. Prior knowledge about the contents or objectives of a 
task may benefit some crowdsourcing tasks. However, it is possible for workers to have too 
much information. At the most basic level, if the requester is interested in measuring the average 
rating of a target to smooth out the idiosyncratic beliefs of workers, it is obviously preferable to 
ensure that several different individuals rate it, rather than the same individual several times.  
Indeed, all “wisdom of crowds” tasks (Lyon & Pacuit, this volume) that aggregate worker 
responses require that judgments are made independently; when worker responses are not 
independent, errors will be correlated with each other and cannot be canceled out through 
aggregation (e.g., Anderson and Holt, 1997; Hullman, Adar & Shah, 2011). Independence across 
different tasks may also matter in more complex workflows. For example, if workers are 
required to complete several related tasks in stages, such as transcribing text and then rating 
other workers’ transcriptions for accuracy, requesters would want to avoid situations in which the 
same worker translates and evaluates the accuracy of their own translation.
The sheer size and anonymity of crowds makes it easy to underestimate the likelihood of 
duplicate workers. After all, with thousands of tasks and thousands of workers, what is the 
probability that the same worker would end up processing the same information twice? Two 
factors make this more likely than it might otherwise seem. First, workers tend to follow favorite 
requesters by subscribing to websites that alert them whenever favored requesters make work 
available for completion (e.g., www.turkalert.com). Second, workers complete varying numbers 
of tasks, with most of the work completed by a small group of extremely prolific workers. For 
example, we found that in a sample of sixteen thousand completed task submissions, the most 
prolific 1% of workers was responsible for completing 10% of the work, and the most prolific 
10% were responsible for providing 41% of the observations (Chandler et al., in press, see also 
Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2012; Grady & Lease, 2010). 
While Amazon by default prevents workers from completing the same task twice as a part 
of a single batch of tasks, additional measures (such as the use of Qualifications or third party 
software; Chandler et al., in press; Goldin & Darlow, 2013; Pe’er, Paolacci, Chandler & Mueller, 
2012) must be used to ensure that workers across different tasks or across different HITs within 
the same batch of tasks are kept unique. 
Workers may also share information with each other about the nature of a task, or collude 
in the responses they provide (Kazai & Milic-Frayling, 2009). Workers gather in forums (e.g., 
http://www.reddit.com/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor, mturkforum.com) to share information and 
opinions about tasks (e.g., particularly interesting and lucrative HITs), which could potentially 
lead them to have foreknowledge of certain task details. Thus, tasks that rely heavily on initial 
impressions of a target of judgment, or tasks that screen out workers based on specific responses, 
should be designed with care to minimize worker foreknowledge. 
Worker Honesty. Some tasks may require that people post information that is not 
directly verifiable or that has no factually correct response. For example, a requester may want to 
solicit opinions about a particular image or idea, or may want to know a worker’s geographical 
location to assess their knowledge about local businesses. In general, workers provide factually 
accurate information (Shapiro et al., 2013) but deception can increase substantially is workers 
benefit from lying (Suri, Goldstein & Mason, 2011). In particular, on MTurk, large numbers of 
non-US workers claim to be US residents in order to receive cash payments (perhaps because 
workers in most other countries are paid with Amazon credit rather than cash).
Ensuring Data Quality in Crowdsourcing Marketplaces
Data quality is determined by numerous factors, some of which are under the control of 
requesters. Obtaining quality data is most straightforward for tasks that can be divided into many 
smaller components. This makes it easier for workers to select elements of the task that they 
enjoy or are good at while minimizing the learning curve. Further, smaller tasks are often 
completed more efficiently because minimally motivated workers can still provide useful data 
(Mason & Watts, 2009). Additional steps can be added to ensure quality control. For example, 
Mechanical Turk workers can successfully proofread and condense complex text, when a task is 
broken into smaller subtasks of finding problems, fixing problems and verifying proposed fixes 
(Bernstein et al., 2010).
For complex tasks, it may also be necessary to test worker ability before hand, and 
restrict access to workers who possess the necessary skills, or to consider other online labor 
markets (e.g. oDesk) that match requesters with more specialized workers. Regardless of the 
software platform requesters use to recruit workers, they should also consider what software is 
best suited to the collection of work. Even sites like MTurk that allow tasks to be created using 
their own website also allow tasks to be created on a separate webpage or software program that 
is linked to or embedded within the web interface (Mason & Suri, 2012). Thus, requesters should 
not feel constrained by the platform used to distribute the work. 
Task Design. There are many potential uses of crowdsourcing websites, and there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution to task design. In general, the approach requesters take when designing 
a task is more important than the specific design choices they make. Tasks should always be pilot 
tested, first by the requester and then by a small pool of workers, before being fully distributed to 
workers. Crowd interest is greatest when a HIT is first posted (Chilton, Horton, Miller & 
Azenkot, 2010), and minor mistakes can quickly become expensive. MTurk provides a 
“requester sandbox” in which the technical details of tasks can be tested by a requester. For pilot 
testing on workers, requesters should provide both the task of interest, and questions about the 
task of interest, to identify potential improvements in design (Collins, Joseph, & Bielaczyc, 
2004). They should also have a clear benchmark against which the quality of work can be 
evaluated. 
Although comparatively little research has been done on task design itself (for exceptions 
see Hosseini et al, 2012; Khanna, Ratan, Davis & Thies, 2010), there is a large literature on 
survey design that is relevant to requesters, which may be useful when considering data quality 
issues identified in pilot testing. Surveys are similar to crowdsourcing tasks in that instructions 
are communicated to workers rather than jointly discussed, and responses are collected through 
similar standardized methods. Consequently, it may be useful to requesters to consult a general 
overview of web survey construction when designing tasks (e.g. Couper, 2008) in addition to 
more general resources on web design (e.g., Krug, 2009). 
Screening Workers. As discussed earlier, MTurk allows requesters to select workers for 
inclusion in tasks based on whether or not they possess specific attributes. In general, workers 
with more experience and a higher reputation should be less likely to provide poor quality work. 
There is also evidence of differences in the quality of work provided by workers from different 
geographical locations, perhaps reflecting language difficulties or differences in education 
(Goodman et al., 2012; Kazai, Kamps, & Millec-Frayling, 2012). Alternatively, or additionally, 
requesters can create their own qualifications to screen workers according to more specific 
criteria such as their competence on particular tasks (e.g., Chua, Milosavlijevic, & Curran, 2009; 
Zhou, Resnick & Mei, 2011; for details on how to implement these procedures in Mechanical 
Turk see Chandler et al., in press).
Preventing Satisficing. Since many workers are motivated by money to complete tasks 
as efficiently as possible, satisficing (providing minimally adequate responses; Krosnick, 2006) 
is a major concern. Instructions or task elements can be presented sequentially with delays 
between each new piece of information to slow workers down (Kapelner & Chandler, 2010). 
Satisficing can be further reduced by introducing features that require workers to think about the 
“correct” response rather than simply providing their first impressions. One study asked workers 
and experts to evaluate the quality of Wikipedia pages. Worker ratings and expert ratings were 
uncorrelated, except when workers were also required to include answers to objectively 
verifiable questions (Kittur et al., 2008). Similarly, other researchers found that accuracy 
improved when workers were asked to predict how other workers would respond to a question 
rather than simply offer their own opinion (“Bayesian truth serum”; Shaw, Horton & Chen, 2011; 
for a discussion see Prelec, 2004). 
Worker motivation can also be increased. Crowds perform better on meaningful tasks 
(Chandler & Kapelner, 2013, see also Reed et al., this volume). Another alternative is to simply 
pay workers to pay attention.  MTurk allows requesters to award bonuses to workers above and 
beyond the initial rate paid for completing work. Thus, requesters can structure a task to make it 
monetarily rewarding for workers to pay attention. To illustrate, in a pair of virtually identical 
studies (conducted by the third author of the present chapter), MTurk workers were paid either a 
total sum for participating ($1) or a smaller initial sum ($.30) with the remainder ($.70) paid as a 
bonus for successfully recalling details about the experimental manipulation. Although both sets 
of workers had the same potential earnings, those paid a smaller sum plus a performance bonus 
were more likely to correctly answer the factual multiple choice questions (98.2%) than 
participants who were paid a lump sum (87.0%), χ²(1, N = 494) = 23.03, p < .001 (see also Shaw, 
Horton & Chen, 2011). Interestingly, the success of bonuses in promoting attention seems to be 
independent of the bonus amount (Chandler & Horton, 2011). 
Identifying Poor Quality Workers. There are a number of strategies that can be used to 
identify poor quality workers. Responses by workers who frequently disagree with their peers 
can be excluded (Elson & McKeown, 2010; Sheerman-Chase, Own & Bowden, 2011). 
Alternatively, “gold-standard” questions with factually correct answers, or “catch-trials” with 
obviously correct responses can be included along with the task of interest to measure worker 
ability and attentiveness (e.g., Sayeedet al., 2011). Tasks submitted along with incorrect 
responses to these questions can be excluded from analysis under the assumption that other 
components of the task are likely to also be incorrect. Additionally, or alternatively, all of the  
responses provided by workers who fail a predetermined number of such checks can be 
excluded.
Multiple choice questions are frequently used to measure data quality because they are 
easily scored. The assumption is that workers who do not take the task seriously, or who do not 
understand the instructions, will likely respond at random, and are thus likely to select incorrect 
responses. In general, the sensitivity of gold-standard multiple choice questions to detect quality 
responses increases asymptotically: All else being equal, a single, four-item multiple choice 
question will only identify the 75% of random responders who select one of the three incorrect 
answers, while two four-item multiple choice questions will identify the 96% of random 
responders who select an incorrect answer on either or both questions. The actual ability of 
multiple choice questions to detect random responding is also dependent on the quality of the 
response alternatives (cf., Case & Swanson, 2001). 
Measuring Data Quality. Data quality is often quantifiable and measurable. Reliability 
of categorical or continuous ratings can be evaluated based on its agreement with ground-truth, 
expert ratings or worker consensus. The critical question is whether agreement is sufficiently 
better than chance, although the level of agreement necessary is highly task dependent. 
Crowdsourced data is unusual in that not all workers complete all elements of a task 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Reliability of data with this property can be measured using 
Krippendorff’s alpha (for SAS and SPSS macros see Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). High 
reliability scores between workers is a function of both task difficulty and the number of raters 
and is a necessary precondition for valid responses. If reliability is low, it could suggest poorly 
communicated instructions or a plurality of acceptable answers.  Reliability can be increased by 
refining worker instructions and increasing the number of workers who perform each task. 
Cleaning and aggregating responses. Responses by different workers can also be 
combined. In general, aggregating the ratings of many independent judgments, even through 
averaging or a simple majority, will increase their accuracy, as idiosyncratic errors cancel each 
other out (Galton, 1907). More complex methods of aggregating responses can improve data 
quality yet further. Some approaches use quantitative methods to improve quality, trimming 
responses that are likely to be outliers (Jung & Lease, 2011) or estimating worker quality and 
then weighting their responses on specific tasks accordingly (Hosseini et al., 2012; Tang & 
Lease, 2011). Other approaches use workers themselves to review and combine responses in an 
interactive, iterative process (Nickerson et al., 2011). 
As a final note, aggregation does not increase the likelihood of a correct solution unless 
each judgment is independent. If a majority of answers are identical but agreement is not 
independent - either because workers have discussed their responses beforehand or because care 
was not taken to avoid duplicate respondents (see limitations section) - then the value of the 
majority's opinion may be suspect. Likewise, aggregation will not provide a correct solution for 
problems in which workers are systematically wrong, either because they lack the necessary 
information to reach a correct conclusion or because cognitive biases lead workers to draw 
incorrect conclusions.
Conclusions
Crowdsourcing marketplaces present an opportunity to researchers who require human 
computation services, especially for tasks that are small, require a variety of different skills or 
interests, or are intermittent in their availability. They offer a persistent workforce that is  
available on demand for an affordable price. However, data provided by workers is not inevitably 
high quality: tasks must be designed to maximize the likelihood and ease with which workers 
can provide useful responses. This is fundamentally an iterative process, and worker feedback in 
initial stages can provide insight into improving tasks. 
While specific design considerations largely depend on the researcher’s goals, task design 
can be improved iteratively through pilot testing, and a number of principles exist that can 
improve the quality of data collected on crowdsourcing marketplaces.  In particular, crowd 
members are heterogeneous and requesters can take advantage of this by preselecting workers 
who are most capable of performing specific tasks. Further, tasks can be optimized so that 
workers can understand them and feel motivated to complete them correctly. Finally, despite 
varying rates of participation by individual workers, quality can be measured, and to a certain 
extent improved, through aggregating responses. In this sense, the output of the crowd can be 
greater than the sum of its parts.  
Online marketplaces have developed rapidly in the past few years. While it is notoriously 
difficult to predict what will happen in the future (e.g., Tetlock, 2005), there are a few 
developments that seem particularly plausible. Network effects give Mechanical Turk a large 
competitive moat against alternative platforms, but individuals are working to counter some of 
its limitations within its current framework. Requesters are beginning to use it as merely a 
gateway to request labor, and are directing workers to complete tasks on other software platforms 
that allow dynamic and real-time collaborative tasks. 
Perhaps more crucially, workers and requesters alike are developing the means to 
increase market transparency. While Amazon has implemented minimal channels for transmitting 
information directly between requesters and workers, and indirectly between various requesters, 
much of the increased transparency discussed in this chapter is a result of requesters and workers 
finding their own means of communicating with each other outside of Amazon’s platform. 
However, information exchange is still relatively limited.  There is no public register of 
market participants, and workers can only be recruited using a narrow range of metadata. 
Additionally, requesters are unable to access information about general market conditions or task 
completion rates that would allow them to optimize tasks and compensation rates, or to directly 
match tasks with workers of varying levels of skill and motivation.  Often, requesters must build 
their own panel of workers (which takes time) based on information that was privately collected, 
or shared in informal, insecure ways.  Perhaps worse, workers have no access to requesters' 
profiles, making the relationship between Requesters and Workers inherently asymmetrical. 
Some workers rely on independent websites that allow workers to rate and subscribe to 
requesters. However, in general workers are unable to determine which tasks pay fairly and 
which qualifications are worth the unpaid effort necessary to complete them. For requesters, 
completions times thus depend heavily on whether their tasks are credentialed in an external 
forum (Chandler et al., in press). More generally, poor quality requesters run the risk of creating 
something close to a “market of lemons” in which the highest quality workers refuse to 
participate because of these issues (Akerlof, 1970; for a discussion see Horton, 2010). All of 
these issues hinder the effectiveness of MTurk as a labor market, and we anticipate that workers 
and requesters will continue to increase information exchange and transparency.
Another interesting question is what tasks online labor markets will be used for in the 
future. As machine perception and language processing improve, it is likely that demand for 
human and human-machine hybrid computational solutions will no longer be needed for these 
tasks. Just as steam drills replaced railroad workers, and office productivity software has 
replaced middle class white collar employees, so too will software replace crowds, for some 
tasks. It remains to be seen whether crowdsourcing, especially microtask labor markets, are 
merely a solution to temporary deficiencies in the advance of machine computing, or if, as has 
occurred in other labor markets, new tasks will continue to emerge as a technology advances. For 
instance, as workflow management platforms become more automated, iterative tasks may 
become possible. As research about task decomposition develops, there will be opportunities to 
use microtask markets for problems that require increasingly complex and creative solutions. As 
more data becomes digitized and interconnected, there will be more opportunity to search for 
interrelations between increasingly disparate topics. Finally, a larger sociological question that  
remains to be answered is how these changes within crowdsourcing marketplaces may impact 
other labor markets and society at large. 
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